Legislature(2001 - 2002)
01/31/2002 03:30 PM Senate STA
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* first hearing in first committee of referral
+ teleconferenced
= bill was previously heard/scheduled
+ teleconferenced
= bill was previously heard/scheduled
ALASKA STATE LEGISLATURE
SENATE STATE AFFAIRS COMMITTEE
January 31, 2002
3:30 p.m.
MEMBERS PRESENT
Senator Gene Therriault, Chair
Senator Randy Phillips, Vice Chair
Senator Rick Halford
Senator Ben Stevens
Senator Bettye Davis
MEMBERS ABSENT
All Members Present
COMMITTEE CALENDAR
SENATE BILL NO. 235
"An Act relating to emergency and disaster relief forces as state
employees for purposes of workers' compensation benefits;
relating to the Emergency Management Assistance Compact and the
implementation of the compact; and providing for an effective
date."
MOVED CSSB 235(STA) OUT OF COMMITTEE
SENATE BILL NO. 236
"An Act making supplemental and other appropriations for homeland
security; and providing for an effective date."
HEARD AND HELD
SENATE BILL NO. 237
"An Act relating to civil defense and disasters; and providing
for an effective date."
SCHEDULED BUT NOT HEARD
SENATE BILL NO. 238
"An Act relating to state plans and programs for the safety and
security of facilities and systems in the state; and providing
for an effective date."
SCHEDULED BUT NOT HEARD
SENATE BILL NO. 239
"An Act relating to state employees who are called to active duty
as reserve or auxiliary members of the armed forces of the United
States; and providing for an effective date."
MOVED SB 239 OUT OF COMMITTEE
SENATE BILL NO. 240
"An Act relating to the crimes of damaging an oil or gas pipeline
or supporting facility, criminal mischief, and terroristic
threatening; making conforming amendments; and providing for an
effective date."
HEARD AND HELD
PREVIOUS COMMITTEE ACTION
SB 235 - See State Affairs minutes dated 1/24/02.
SB 236 - No previous action to record.
SB 237 - See State Affairs minutes dated 1/24/02.
SB 238 - See State Affairs minutes dated 1/24/02.
SB 239 - See State Affairs minutes dated 1/24/02.
SB 240 - See State Affairs minutes dated 1/24/02.
WITNESS REGISTER
Joe Balash
Senate State Affairs Staff
Alaska State Capitol, Room 121
Juneau, AK 99801-1182
POSITION STATEMENT: Explained the proposed committee substitute
for SB 235
Annie Carpeneti
Department of Law
PO Box 110300
Juneau, AK 99811-0300
POSITION STATEMENT: Explained SB 240
Major General Phil Oates
Department of Military &
Veterans Affairs
PO Box 5800
Ft Richardson, AK 99505-0800
POSITION STATEMENT: Presentation to support SB 236
Del Smith, Deputy Commissioner
Department of Public Safety
PO Box 111200
Juneau, AK 99811-1200
POSITION STATEMENT: Presentation to support SB 236
Boyd Brownfield, Deputy Commissioner
Department of Transportation &
Public Facilities
3132 Channel Dr.
Juneau, AK 99801-7898
POSITION STATEMENT: Presentation to support SB 236
Brad Thompson, Director
Risk Management
Department of Administration
PO Box 110200
Juneau, AK 99811-0200
POSITION STATEMENT: Answered questions on SB 236
Jay Livey, Deputy Commissioner
Department of Health &
Social Services
PO Box 110601
Juneau, AK 99801-0601
POSITION STATEMENT: Presentation on SB 236
Mike Conway,
Department of Environmental Conservation
410 Willoughby
Juneau, AK 99801-1795
POSITION STATEMENT: Answered questions on SB 236
Wayne Rush
Department of Military and Veterans Affairs
P.O. Box 5750
Ft. Richardson, AK 99505
POSITION STATEMENT: Testified on SB 236
ACTION NARRATIVE
TAPE 02-4, SIDE A
CHAIRMAN GENE THERRIAULT called the Senate State Affairs
Committee meeting to order at 3:30 p.m. Present were Senators
Davis, Stevens, Phillips and Chairman Therriault. Senator Halford
arrived after the meeting began.
The first order of business was SB 235.
SB 235-EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT ASSISTANCE COMPACT
JOE BALASH, staff to the Senate State Affairs Committee,
explained the work draft (C version) incorporates the technical
amendments requested at the previous meeting. The first appears
on page 2 and the second occurs on page 10. The final change
comes in response to a question raised concerning the activities
a volunteer would be engaged in and whether or not that
individual would be covered by the state's worker compensation
program in the event of injury or death. Wording on page 2, lines
13 and 14 clarifies that the volunteer is providing emergency
services that were requested by the Department of Military and
Veteran's Affairs for that emergency.
CHAIRMAN THERRIAULT reminded members the question raised
previously concerned freelance services versus services that were
formally requested for a specific emergency. This establishes
that such freelance services will not be covered under state
worker compensation.
SENATOR PHILLIPS asked if the changes would impact the fiscal
note.
MR. BALASH said they would not.
CHAIRMAN THERRIAULT added the final change should prevent fiscal
impact.
He asked for a motion to accept the C version of SB 235 as the
working document.
SENATOR PHILLIPS moved the C version as the working document.
There was no objection.
CHAIRMAN THERRIAULT asked if there were any further amendments to
come before the committee. There were none. He asked for the will
of the committee.
SENATOR PHILLIPS moved CSSB 235(STA) and attached fiscal note
from committee with individual recommendations.
There being no objection, CSSB 235(STA) moved from committee.
SB 239-STATE EMPLOYEES CALLED TO MILITARY DUTY
CHAIRMAN THERRIAULT announced there were no outstanding questions
from committee members and there were no requests for amendments
from any agencies.
He then asked committee members whether they had any questions
and they did not. He asked for the will of the committee.
SENATOR PHILLIPS moved SB 239 and attached fiscal note from
committee with individual recommendations.
There being no objection, SB 239 moved from committee.
SB 240-TERRORISTIC THREATENING/PIPELINE DAMAGE
CHAIRMAN THERRIAULT announced there was a proposed committee
substitute (CS) before the committee and a request from the
departments to consider additional language. He asked for a
motion to adopt the \C version as the working document.
SENATOR DAVIS moved to adopt the \C version of SB 240 as the
working document. There was no objection.
CHAIRMAN THERRIAULT asked Annie Carpeneti to explain the proposed
amendment.
ANNIE CARPENETI from the Department of Law explained the
amendment before the committee was the result of additional
conversations among state attorneys general who are identifying
areas of the law that should be strengthened to provide for
adequate response to crimes committed by terrorists.
The first is an amendment to the conspiracy laws to add three new
target crimes to the present law. These additions are:
1. Conspiracy to intentionally cause damage to an oil or gas
pipeline or supporting facility.
2. Terroristic threatening by conspiring to send a dangerous
substance such as anthrax or an imitation substance to
another person.
3. Conspiring to commit criminal mischief in the first degree
such as tampering with an oil or gas pipeline or supporting
facility.
The second suggestion would provide amendments to the statutes
addressing murder in the first degree. It adds:
1. Intentionally causing damage to an oil or gas pipeline that
directly results in the death of a person.
2. Committing terroristic threatening in the first degree and
in the course of or furtherance of the offense or in
immediate flight from that offense, the death of a person is
the direct result.
CHAIRMAN THERRIAULT asked for clarification of, "death during
flight from the scene."
MS. CARPENETI explained it refers to perpetrators fleeing the
scene. It does not apply to one victim fleeing the scene who
happens to run over another fleeing victim.
CHAIRMAN THERRIAULT then asked for clarification of, "a direct
result of."
MS. CARPENETI replied it must happen in the course of or
furtherance of the underlying crime. It can't be an accidental
crime that's unconnected to the actions of the person
perpetrating the underlying felony.
CHAIRMAN THERRIAULT said the meaning of, "a direct result" is
clear if a pipeline facility is blown up and a worker is
killed in the explosion, but what about an individual that has
a heart attack?
MS. CARPENETI said if the individual is at the scene and has a
heart attack as a result of being present and under the stress
of the explosion then the law would apply. However, it would
not apply to injured or killed firefighters who would come to
put out the fire because that wouldn't be in the course of or
furtherance of the felony.
CHAIRMAN THERRIAULT asked if there would be a connection if a
bomb struck the Capitol Building and an individual in the
State Office Building next door died of a heart attack.
MS. CARPENETI said it probably would not apply here because it
would not be in the course of the explosion in the Capitol
Building.
MS. CARPENETI said the last item covered in the amendment came
as a suggestion from the legislative attorney, Jerry
Luckhaupt, and may have been addressed in the CS. It is for
terroristic threatening in the first degree to apply to real
or imitation biological or chemical substances.
CHAIRMAN THERRIAULT said it was not covered in the CS and
advised committee members the bill wording said, "an imitation
substance."
MS. CARPENETI established if a real substance such as anthrax
was sent and no one was harmed it wouldn't apply so the
amendment makes the repair.
CHAIRMAN THERRIAULT noted section 2 of the CS creates a new
category of conspiracy and he questioned why this wasn't
incorporated into the existing statutes on conspiracy.
MS. CARPENETI pointed out it isn't referring to conspiracy but
criminal mischief by damaging an oil or gas pipeline or
supporting facility. She explained they brought this up to
criminal mischief in the first degree as a separate crime
because it is only one act, not a series of acts. They could
have incorporated this into existing statutes and had criminal
mischief in five degrees rather than four degrees, but doing
so would require changing all the other statutes.
Additionally, such a change would be cause for some confusion
in law enforcement because criminal mischief in the first
degree, which is now a class B felony, would change to a class
A felony.
CHAIRMAN THERRIAULT announced his intention to continue
working with the legal department to address the drafting
choice on section 2.
SENATOR PHILLIPS expressed the same concern.
CHAIRMAN THERRIAULT thought the final document would be ready
next week.
CSSB 240 was held in committee.
SB 236-HOMELAND SECURITY APPROPRIATIONS
CHAIRMAN THERRIAULT advised committee members he intended to
walk through the bill sections but would not pass it out of
committee that day. He asked Major General Phil Oates to make
the introduction.
MAJOR GENERAL PHIL OATES, Adjutant General for Alaska and
Commissioner for the Department of Military and Veterans
Affairs, testified as the chairman of the Disaster Policy
Cabinet (DPC). He said representatives from the following five
sub cabinets would give reports on terrorism preparations and
requirements from their perspectives:
1. Security Overall: Del Smith, Department of Public Safety
(DPS)
2. Energy Security: Del Smith, DPS
3. Information Technology Protection: Dan Spencer,
Department of Administration (DOA)
4. Transportation Security: Boyd Brownfield, Department of
Transportation and Public Facilities (DOT/PF)
5. Domestic Preparedness and Consequence Management: Jay
Livey, Department of Health and Social Services (DHSS),
Mike Conway Department of Environmental Conservation
(DEC), Wayne Rush, Department of Military and Veterans
Affairs (DMV)
He recognized Mike Mitchell from the office of the Attorney
General, Navy Captain Gary Klink who is the Alaska Defense
Coordinating Officer, and John Pennington the FEMA director for
region 10.
He gave a brief summary of the meeting with President Bush and
the head of Homeland Security, Governor Tom Ridge. Every state
was invited to send their Homeland Security point of contact
person to the briefing.
Governor Ridge warned, "The threat of terrorist attacks and
significant terrorist attacks against our nation is now a
permanent part of our lives." Identification of individual points
of contact has been helpful as states develop their plans. The
immediate task at hand is to develop a comprehensive multi-year
strategy with FEMA coordinating preparations, tasking and
applications for training and exercises. They will be the agency
to work with for both preparation for and recovery from attack.
Key first steps are:
· Build up of public health capacity
· Reinforce security and commerce across borders with Canada
and Mexico
· Establish a language of alert to allow more specific
warnings to citizens
· Develop protocols to deal with large events
The following principles are driving the policy process for the
national security strategy.
1. Securing the homeland
2. Spending well
3. Building a package to raise Homeland Security to a permanent
high level
4. Partnerships
The key elements of the Homeland Security strategy:
· A national and comprehensive approach
· Established priorities, goals and missions
· A cross cutting budget plan
· A comprehensible clear and not too long strategy
Following are the new national alert or threat warning levels
· Critical is the highest level
· Serious
· Alert
· Ready is the base level. Previously "normal" was the base
level but there is no longer a normal.
The Alaska Office of Homeland Security will build the mechanisms
for who dictates those threat levels and who is responsible at
private and public levels to determine who responds and how they
respond.
His assessment is that Alaska is in good shape but it is not
prepared to deal with the weapons of mass destruction events.
To the frequently asked question, "Is there a threat to Alaska?"
he responds:
· We can be attacked collaterally without being attacked
directly. An anthrax or smallpox incident would be such an
attack.
· Our oil infrastructure is significant to Alaska and the
nation and it has points that are vulnerable.
· Homegrown high explosive events such as Oklahoma City are
likely
SENATOR PHILLIPS asked whether all 50 states were represented.
MAJOR GENERAL OATES said participants included all 50 states,
territories and the District of Columbia.
4:05 p.m.
MAJOR GENERAL OATES showed a video on terrorism.
4:12 p.m.
MAJOR GENERAL OATES told committee members the DPC is asking
legislators for not just the appropriation but also for help in
determining the level of risk the state is willing to take.
Although a weapons of mass destruction (WMD) event is unlikely in
Alaska, the consequences of such an event could be greater than
the consequences of every event that has happened since
statehood. To deal with such an event they have tried to develop
capability and capacity that covers the entire spectrum of
emergency management.
The Disaster Policy Cabinet used the following process to
determine monetary allocations to deal with WMD and protection of
the citizenry:
· Established five sub-cabinets who met and prepared a report
to the Governor
· The Governor approved the report
· Legislators received a list of bills for statutory changes
and appropriations
The principles established to guide efforts of the Disaster
Policy Cabinet were:
1. Develop things to strengthen existing programs
particularly those that protect and save lives.
2. Improve capabilities for responding to all emergencies
3. Identify and protect assets of national and statewide
importance
4. Maintain continuity of government operations at all
times.
5. Reinforce first responder capabilities
6. Use deployable resources to augment areas with
inadequate capabilities
7. Maintain an appropriate balance between security and
individual freedom
8. Maintain the ability to communicate at all times
9. Maximize the use of existing or anticipated federal
programs and grants
10. Share costs at all levels both public and private
Key assets in Alaska that need to be protected are listed in the
report and range from:
· Utilities and protecting water sources
· Protecting cruise ships and gatherings of tourists
· Protecting strategic position on the Pacific Rim
· Protecting military infrastructure and growing programs
· Protecting key state and federal buildings
The cabinet recognizes:
· There is no specific threat that exists against Alaska
currently that requires calling out a greater level of
protection but that could change at any time.
· The less protected you are, the more obvious you become as a
target. Terrorist history is attacking targets that are less
well protected.
· Terrorists are able to share and send information and mass
rapidly.
· There are good interagency processes.
· The most likely attacks would be high explosive.
· Chemical, biological, nuclear and radiological attacks are
less likely but more catastrophic.
What are the practiced procedures in place now for a strong
response to an emergency?
1. A strong Office of the Governor
2. An Adjutant General who is also the emergency manager
3. A federal response plan that is reinforced from national,
st
4. A Disaster Policy Cabinet that meets and gives the governor
and legislature coordinated recommendations on how to
respond with resources currently in possession
5. The governor is able to declare a state disaster then ask
for federal disaster designation
6. There is a State Emergency Operations Plan to cover primary
and supporting departmental responsibilities
7. There is a State Emergency Coordination Center open
365/24/7's and a State Emergency Response Commission
8. There are hazardous materials working groups that can be
deployed throughout the state
9. First responder money will provide level A HazMat units for
Juneau and Valdez and police will receive level B protection
4:20 p.m.
TAPE 02-4, SIDE B
The Emergency Management Assistance Compact (EMAC) partners with
all states. It puts resources on a duty roster basis so you know
where you are in the queue to help other states and have
mechanism where those resources are paid for and you're not
responsible for any of the actions while they respond. A state
may also keep those resources in state if there is an ongoing
emergency there.
The National Guard offers a unique ability to respond to an
emergency. It is uniquely postured and situated for critical site
defense for operations in hazardous material and to have a WMD
civil support team
The general State of Alaska priorities that flowed from DPC
findings:
· The ability to respond depends on a strong public safety
capability
· Public health, pharmaceutical and laboratory capability is
inadequate for a large air disaster much less a WMD event
· Need the ability to deploy civil, government and military
resources
st
· Need better training program and equipment for 1 responders
· Need to continue improving communication systems
The Office of Homeland Security is needed to get programs up and
running.
· This office is not a permanent addition to the state
infrastructure.
· This office provides a dedicated effort to get federal
funding, grants and first responder money and not compete
with emergencies that are handled on a day to day basis.
· The office has a director at the senior level and
individuals from the key departments.
· This office will conduct a survey of key entities so the
state will comply with the nationally designated warning
systems. They will identify who is there to protect at each
level of threat and who has the authority to identify
threats and call up a higher level of protection.
· It will provide procedures for who to call, how to respond
and how to practice or train.
MAJOR GENERAL OATES asked for direction to facilitate the
deliberations on this important issue.
CHAIRMAN THERRIAULT asked if the points made were from the entire
list or just the prioritized list that came through in the form
of the Governor's bills.
MAJOR GENERAL OATES said the list includes the most urgent
priorities and the recommendations for the longer term. They have
established the State of Alaska priorities and these are "cross
walked" with the actual physical requirements and the requests
that they are presenting.
CHAIRMAN THERRIAULT then asked about notes in the spreadsheet
margins that say, "may need legislation." He advised a fiscal
note should be attached to a piece of legislation.
MAJOR GENERAL OATES said they would probably be addressed line by
line during the next meeting. They do have the full budget
submission backing up the spreadsheet that is included to give
more information on each of the requirements.
CHAIRMAN THERRIAULT asked how much had been incorporated into the
2003 budget discussions.
MAJOR GENERAL OATES said this is a stand-alone package and is not
included in the Governor's budget.
SENATOR PHILLIPS asked whether there are any other states that
are better prepared than Alaska.
MAJOR GENERAL OATES replied the actions taken to date put Alaska
at the head of the list, but Alaska has some unique challenges
due to size and geography.
SENATOR PHILLIPS then asked if anyone has looked at the Israel
model.
MAJOR GENERAL OATES said that's a great observation. Their
procedures work well but they have more controls on freedoms than
in the United States.
SENATOR PHILLIPS said his point is that he wants to know whether
their criteria for program development for self-defense has been
examined and are those findings applied here.
MAJOR GENERAL OATES said from his experience it is. It is clear
we need to learn from their experience.
CHAIRMAN THERRIAULT called for the first agency report.
4:30 p.m.
PUBLIC SAFETY AND ENERGY SECURITY
DEL SMITH, Deputy Commissioner of the Department of Public
Safety, said his subcommittee report covers overall security and
security in the energy industries.
Their considerations focused upon the Alyeska Pipeline, the
infrastructure at its terminus and the infrastructure located for
the production on the Slope. They involved both state officials
and private pipeline security personnel in their discussions. As
a result of their discussions, there is now a checkpoint on the
Dalton Highway south of the Yukon River Bridge that provides
needed security at a vulnerable point on the pipeline.
They focused primarily on national level implications for
disasters or attack and determined the economic impact of losing
the pipeline is most critical. There are production facilities on
the Kenai Peninsula and other areas of the state where private
companies provide most of the security resources. State troopers
and local police augment those forces in times of concern.
One of their recommendations was to ensure that the border points
manned by the federal government have continuous T-1 telephonic
dial-up capabilities to the national database for checking
identities.
They asked for additional state trooper personnel and equipment
because there weren't the resources available in Anchorage on
September 11 to respond to any emergency beyond that already
identified.
They tried to determine points of national concern and security
for Alaska and provide protection by:
1. Screening those who come into the state through INS
2. Establishing stations to practice with the military, FBI
and others to respond to attacks on the pipeline
3. Supplementing pipeline security and the corridor and other
areas of the state by having people who can respond
CHAIRMAN THERRIAULT asked about the recommendation listed on page
6 to add one civilian member to a permanent post south of the
Yukon River Bridge on the Dalton Highway.
MR. SMITH explained this would be a post whose responsibility
covers the entire pipeline corridor and this position would
provide the clerical support.
CHAIRMAN THERRIAULT then asked if there was justification, other
than simply increased presence, for adding six constables, 20
village public safety officers (VPSOs).
MR. SMITH replied they have tried to work with the Alaska State
Troopers to establish a three-tier approach to law enforcement
outside of cities. The VPSOs are the most local and are the first
responders in many parts of Alaska.
CHAIRMAN THERRIAULT then commented he can see justification for
the level B HazMat suit request for existing personnel, but not
for increases in areas that aren't readily identified as areas of
weakness.
SENATOR DAVIS asked for an interpretation of total costs.
MR. SMITH said the totals listed cover the requests for personnel
for 2002 and 2003.
There were no additional public safety questions.
4:45 p.m.
TRANSPORTATION SECURITY
BOYD BROWNFIELD, Deputy Director for Operations for the
Department of Transportation (DOT), informed members the
following important aviation fundamentals have not changed since
September 11 and are unlikely to do so.
1. Basic FAA process, regulations and funding programs are
unchanged.
2. FAA concerns for airport safety, security, maintenance and
operation, management and staff proficiency requirements are
unchanged.
Security and safety now clearly share priority one.
The FAA has instituted many new, unfunded mandates demanding
rapid response without regard to specific funding mechanisms or
paybacks. They issued narrow parameters for the use of National
Guard assets severely limiting airport managers to properly
manage airport resources. There were significant increases in
demand for more law enforcement officers (LEOs) that were not
available and not funded.
DOT has worked with the FAA to gain authorization for more
liberal use of National Guard troops at airports, to obtain a
waiver from both the 300-foot no use offset in front of all rural
airports and the requirement that LEOs be physically present at
the rural airports.
DOT must consider that rural airports could be viewed as a weak
link whereby terrorists could enter into the secure side of the
national airport system to position for an attack to a more
lucrative target.
The Alaska Marine Highway and Alaskan road and bridge security
and safety considerations are similar to aviation requirements.
Vulnerabilities are being assessed and federal funding is being
vigorously pursued.
The Homeland Transportation subcommittee has three sub groups.
1. Surface transportation including highways, bridges and
railroad
2. Aviation including Ted Stevens Airport, Fairbanks
International, and the rural airports
3. Marine highway system including the Alaska Marine
Highway, ports and harbors and cruise ship security
Each subgroup focused on five particular issues.
1. Status of existing assets
2. Security currently in place
3. Vulnerability aspects
4. Establishment of security priorities
5. Long and short range recommendations for increased
protection
Common themes across subgroups:
1. Prevention
2. Mitigation
3. Preparedness and contingency planning
4. Communication
5. Emphasis on security
6. Training
The final report explains the transportation security sub-cabinet
efforts and conclusions in detail and has all the recommendations
that they made.
DOT is taking on a high level, high visibility, proactive and
responsive security role that, prior to September 11, was of
minor consequence. There is a clear need for it to have a single
focus point to address, coordinate and integrate the security
measures of all transportation modes throughout the department
and coordinate with others such as Alaska Airlines.
SENATOR PHILLIPS asked what protection is provided for the Port
of Anchorage, the railroad and Elmendorf.
MR. BROWNFIELD replied they have been working with the Port of
Anchorage and it is a high priority.
SENATOR PHILLIPS expressed his opinion that protection of that
area is second in importance only to the pipeline.
TAPE 5, SIDE A
5:10 p.m.
CHAIRMAN THERRIAULT asked for information on purchasing short-
term war risk insurance because current insurance doesn't cover
terrorist attacks.
MR. BROWNFIELD explained this isn't insurance on assets rather it
is liability insurance.
INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY PROTECTION
BRAD THOMPSON, Director of Risk Management Division for the
Department of Administration, explained war risk is a label used
for the two insurances directly affected by the September 11
terrorist attack. The State of Alaska self-insures the normal and
known anticipated loss and then acts as an insurer by reinsuring
for catastrophic protection. Prior to 9/11, the state purchased
$500 million in limits of liability insurance annually to protect
for the ownership and operation of aircraft, airports and
spaceport. Aviation policies carry an exclusion for acts of
vandalism and terrorism that are normally endorsed back. On the
endorsement is a clause that the underwriter has the right of
cancellation upon seven days notice. On September 17 the state
received notice of such cancellation for both aviation and marine
protection. Other policy forms were not affected and as yet have
no exclusion for those types of events.
They have since purchased back the liability coverage they had
prior to September 11. The marine policy has hull and machinery
coverage as well as protection and indemnity coverage for crew
and passenger injuries. Component costs are shown in the
breakouts under the DOT payments for 2002 and estimations for
2003.
5:15 p.m.
DOMESTIC PREPAREDNESS AND CONSEQUENCE MANAGEMENT
JAY LIVEY, Deputy Commissioner for the Department of Health and
Social Services, stated he is co-chair on the consequence
management sub-group that examined biological and bio-terror
events. Identifying that a bioterrorist attack is occurring is
not always obvious and therefore some of the consequences are
different.
They established the following objectives:
1. Mount a coordinated response to terrorist attacks from
all levels of government.
2. Have sufficient trained personnel at the state and local
level to respond to an attack.
3. Have a reliable communication system to support response
to a terrorist attack.
4. Provide state and local first responders with material
and equipment they need to safely and effectively
respond.
5. Provide local and state responders and emergency planners
the opportunity to practice coordinated responses to
attacks.
Strategies developed to attain objectives:
1. Recognized the need for quick action to expand the state's
response capability with regard to hazardous materials
response.
a. Recommended the complete training and outfitting of the
rd
National Guard 103 HazMat Unit for statewide
deployment.
2. Recognized the need for reliable and rapid communication
system particularly for health care providers and first
responders.
a. Complete Alaska Health Alert Network
b. Phase in the implementation of the Alaska Land Mobile
Radio System
3. Recognized the holes in the Public Health system that needed
to be filled to respond to a bioterrorist attack.
a. Additional Public Health nursing, laboratory,
epidemiological support
b. Identify the characteristic of any disease and plan a
response to that disease
c. Measure whether the plan is having any mitigating
effect
4. Recognized the need to do more training of first responders,
local law enforcement and firefighters and to test all
systems.
5:27 p.m.
SENATOR PHILLIPS asked whether they are coordinating with local
governments on water source and identifying potential weak spots.
MIKE CONWAY, Director of Statewide Public Service Division with
the Department of Environmental Conservation, replied it is a
federal, state and locally coordinated effort with the water
utility as the primary floor for security protection.
They are hoping to receive federal funds to conduct drinking
water source protection risk assessments. The Department of
Natural Resources is working with the Municipality of Anchorage
because it has the biggest surface water source.
SENATOR PHILLIPS asked what is being done now. He used the AWWU
Eklutna Water Project as an example because it provides "about 90
percent of the water for most residents in Alaska."
MR. CONWAY said Eklutna Lake is under increased security efforts
by the municipality and federal mandates have also targeted that
source for stepped up measures.
SENATOR PHILLIPS stressed time is of the essence and he would
like to see timelines established. Eklutna Lake simply
illustrates the problem.
WAYNE RUSH, Division of Emergency Services with the Department of
Military and Veterans Affairs (DMVA), stated the number one
priority for the state is the creation of the Office of Homeland
Security staffed with representatives from DMVA, DEC, DNR, HSS
TRA, Public Safety and Administration. Questions about
prioritization and coordination of effort highlight the need for
this office.
The core duties of the Homeland Security Office are:
· Assist intelligence analysis and dissemination
· Maintain a specific threat assessment
· Develop protocols to respond to weapons of mass destruction
events
· Work with the national office of Homeland Security and the
many other federal agencies involved with that office such
as FEMA, DOD, DOJ, Coast Guard, FAA, CDC, FBI
· Provide the governor expert Homeland Security advice
· Coordinate WMD planning, training and exercises
· Develop program budgets and manage WMD terrorism Homeland
Security grants
· Provide a single Homeland Security communications conduit
· Develop and review legislative actions and proposals
· Establish and disseminate threat level criterion procedures
· Assist utilities and other infrastructure with security
assessments
The Disaster Policy Cabinet envisioned the office as transitory
with its continuing requirements handed off to the Division of
Emergency Services.
At the close of his report he stressed the continued need to keep
the State Emergency Coordination Center on an operational
365/24/7 schedule. It's imperative in light of the terrorist
threat to Alaska and the country and was amply demonstrated
during the September 11 disaster and subsequent bioterrorism
incidents.
CHAIRMAN THERRIAULT held SB 236 in committee.
CHAIRMAN THERRIAULT adjourned the meeting at 5:35 p.m.
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